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Abstract: 
The creation of a EUropean demos is often debated by referring to forms of ethnic 
or civic identities. The present article aims to expose the theoretical shortcomings of 
this dichotomous approach, which confines the complexity of EUrope within a 
simplifying methodological nationalism. By relying on empirical data collected in 
four different EUropean regions, the article points to the relevance of a functional 
or utilitarian rationale which EUropean interviewees use to justify the existence of 
EUrope. Although this rationale does not obliterate cultural and civic narrations of 
EUrope, I would argue that it invites to reconsider the traditional role played by 
identities in the construction of political institutions. Accordingly, I believe that 
scholars should take more seriously the metaphor ‘EUrope as a laboratory’ - a 
convenient, but often empty metaphor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some years ago, ‘the nature of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen 1996) was one of the major 
concerns of students of European Integration (EI). This long-lasting debate between 
neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists seemed to come to an end when, in the 
1990s, scholars decided that was no longer worth debating why and how the Euro-polity 
had come into existence, but, once taken for granted, it was more useful looking into its 
governing processes. This new endeavour has since been conducted within the theoretical 
framework of ‘multilevel governance’ (Marks 1993; Jachtenfuchs 1995; Caporaso 1996; 
Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Aalberts 2004; Eberlein 
and Kerwer 2004). This new perspective has certainly contributed to an understanding of 
the institutional functioning of the European Union (EU). It has also solved the 
conundrum between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, by simply accepting 
the coexistence of both processes. Within multilevel governance, in fact, European 
integration does not take place at the expenses of the member states, but these latter 
continue to play an important role, along a variety of other actors (governmental and 
non), which coexist at multiple scales in a non-hierarchical network. 
Yet, if the nature of the beast has somewhat found an answer from an institutional 
perspective, it is still an open and frequently debated question from a cultural and 
political perspective. “Should EUrope embody a civic or ethnic style of identity (if it has 
any identity at all)?” 1 This was the question asked to the panellists of a workshop 
recently organized by the University of Bristol on cultural approaches to European 
integration.2 In the present article, I wish to contribute to this debate by somewhat 
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bringing the voice of the demos back in. By relying on qualitative data collected among 
ordinary people in four different EUropean regions, my aim is to move beyond this 
identity question. Empirical evidence indeed suggests that while people understand 
EUrope as a cultural and civic polity, their narrations also point to a new, post-identity 
EUrope. 
The notion of identity is a highly debated and contested one. Social theorists usually 
prefer avoiding this term, given its resonance with something fixed, stable, and 
stabilizing (Hall 1996; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Identities are better conceptualized as 
discursive resources activated in talk (Somers 1994; Antaki and Widdicombe 1998). 
People do not have identities, but they might identify with, thus signalling identity as a 
process rather than as ontology. I largely share these views, but my aim in the present 
article is not to deconstruct notions of ethnic or civic EUrope from a socially 
constructivist perspective. My aim, instead, is to show the limits of these constructions 
against both the methodological nationalism which, more or less implicitly, they 
reproduce and the views of the respondents which evoke forms of post-identity politics. 
To this scope, in the present paper identity is not deployed as an analytical category, but 
treated as a ‘category of practice’, i.e. a referent used both by ‘lay’ actors in everyday life 
to make sense of themselves, their actions, and ‘others’ and by ‘political entrepreneur’ to 
persuade people to legitimize and support collective action (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 
4). 
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2. Ethnic or civic EUrope – is this really the question?  
 
One of the most renowned contemporary students of the state once asked whether a 
society called ‘Euro’ exists (Mann 1998). This provocative question was accompanied by 
a pretty straightforward answer: EUrope as a socio-political space exists only as a 
network of upper classes and elites, but it remains distant from the emotions of the 
masses whose identities are primarily rooted in national spaces (Mann 1998: 198, 200). 
Moreover, EUrope’s lack of both internal cohesion and external closure (a ‘hard’ 
frontier), as well as a common language which people can use to express their sense of 
common belonging and common destiny represented for Mann (1998: 192, 205) a clear 
obstacle to the transformation of EUrope into a viable polity. 
During the last decade, EUrope’s internal interaction has grown significantly and its 
frontiers have certainly hardened, despite the fact that a common language is still lacking 
and people’s emotions are still primarily rooted, according to Eurobarometer surveys, to 
national and sub-national spaces (Antonsich 2008a). The point, obviously, is not to assess 
the validity of Mann’s view in relation to EUrope’s recent transformation, but to indicate 
how such a view is representative of a form of methodological nationalism which, 
particularly in public discourses, is often used to evaluate EUrope’s development. 
From this perspective, EUrope is indeed regarded as a would-be nation-state and its 
progress being dependent on the degree to which it reproduces those features which 
characterise the nation-state. 3 Thus, for instance, Anthony D. Smith, one of the leading 
scholars in nationalist studies, some years ago observed that “‘Europe’ is deficient both 
as idea and as process” (Smith 1992: 62). According to the famous British scholar, in 
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fact, ‘Europe’ lacks most of the features which defines a nation, i.e., “a named human 
population sharing a historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, 
standardized public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and common 
legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity” (Smith 1992: 60). Apart from 
common economy, territorial mobility and common rights and duties, no historical 
territory indeed exists, as the very definition of Europe, in geographical terms, is a long-
standing conundrum (Heffernan 1998), which reverberates in the present confusion about 
EUrope’s future boundaries (Eder 2006; Rumford 2009). Similar considerations can be 
made for common memories and myths of origin, since many of the traditions which are 
generally invoked to characterize EUrope (Roman law, Christianity, Renaissance, and 
Enlightenment) spread unevenly throughout European regions. Despite student-mobility 
schemes (e.g., ERASMUS, SOCRATES), the existence of a European standardized 
public culture is also difficult to sustain, as curricula remain very much nationally based 
and their recognition across countries is more a matter of theory than practice. Most 
importantly, for Smith, no common language, ethnicity, culture, and ‘mythomoteur’ exist 
to produce a community of ‘affect and interest’ and mobilize people’s imaginary and a 
shared sense of belonging. 
It is exactly this methodological nationalism which, I would argue, is at the basis of 
the idea that EUrope needs an ethnic or cultural identity in order to support its political 
project (see also Leoussi in this issue). The EUropean demos should be a group of people 
sharing the same culture, historical memories, myths, and, possibly, also religion and 
ethnicity. Since such a demos does not exist and it is very unlikely that will come into 
existence in the foreseeable future, despite all efforts put forward by the European 
 6 
Commission for creating a form of ‘banal Europeanism’ (Cram 2001 - see also Shore 
1993), it is not surprising that scholars who adopt this ‘national’ view are sceptical about 
the consolidation of EUrope as a space of affiliation, belonging, and loyalty. 
Antithetical to this position is the so-called ‘post-national’ view, epitomized, among 
others, by the works of Jürgen Habermas. According to the German philosopher, EUrope 
stands for the first post-national democracy, i.e., a democratic polity based on a form of 
collective identity defined not in cultural, but in political terms – the sharing of 
cosmopolitan values and participation in the deliberative democratic process (Habermas 
2001: 88-90). In this case, the demos is not defined in ethnic or cultural terms, i.e., as a 
community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history (Habermas 2001: 
15). Rather, it is a community of citizens who identify themselves with a liberal political 
culture, sustained by the functioning of democratic legal institutions and procedural 
norms – what Habermas calls ‘constitutional patriotism’. It is this idea that Habermas 
(1992) applies to EUrope and the EUropean demos and on which the notion of civic 
EUrope can be based. In this case, EUropean identity is not conceptualized as a pre-
political endowment of a people defined by ethnic and cultural elements, but as a product 
of the functioning of EUrope as a deliberative democracy (Habermas 1998: xxiii). 
Since its theorization by Hans Kohn (1945), the ethnic-civic distinction has long been 
studied and debated by students of nationalism. Yet, it has also been challenged on the 
basis that there is no such thing as civic nationalism. According to Xenos, this is indeed 
an oxymoron, because any form of nationalism requires “a mythologizing of nature and 
of the relationship of the political community to it” (Xenos 1996: 228). Similarly, Yack 
(1996) discards the civic-ethnic distinction as flawed, by suggesting that any nation, 
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however civic it wishes to portray itself, is also constructed on “a rich cultural inheritance 
of shared memories and practices”. 
My argument is not so much about the fallacious character of the civic/ethnic 
distinction, but about its use to make sense of the ‘nature of the beast’ in cultural and 
political terms. It seems to me, in fact, that both ethnic EUrope and civic EUrope fall into 
the same trap of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). While 
this is particularly evident in the case of the ‘ethnic’ view, I would argue that it also 
applies to the ‘civic’ view, as this latter equally theorizes the link between territory, 
people, and politics along the same lines used to understand the nation-state (in this case, 
however, the common identity is civic rather than ethnic). Yet, no explicit rationale is put 
forward to justify this conceptual operation. Why should EUrope be understood through 
the same categories used to scrutinize a very historically-specific product such as the 
nation-state? This critique is obviously not new. Other scholars have indeed manifested 
the need for a more subtle vocabulary to capture something which cannot be equated with 
the political institutions of the historical past (Painter 2001). While the ethnic-civic 
opposition has been a useful analytical framework to understand the formation of the 
nation-state, there is indeed no guarantee that it could also apply to the study of EUrope. 
On the contrary, the reproduction of categories introduced for the study of a given 
historical institution might prevent scholars to detect new, alternative spatial forms of 
socio-political organization which EUrope today might embody. This is why I would 
argue that scholars, as they have managed to move beyond the inveterate opposition 
between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, should also consider a similar 
move beyond the distinction of cultural (ethnic) and political (civic) EUrope.4 
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It is the aim of the present article to contribute to an exploration of this issue, by 
relying on the analysis of EUropean people’s opinions collected in four different regions. 
To bring the voice of the demos back in, I would argue, is a necessary step in this 
exploratory exercise. Too often, in fact, the debate has been conducted in normative 
terms, at the level of political theory and philosophy (Antonsich 2009). While certainly 
useful, I think this level should necessarily be complemented by empirical analysis, so to 
avoid the risk of devising solutions for the demos, which the demos itself would find alien 
and ultimately reject. 
 
 
3. Bringing the demos back in 
 
The empirical material discussed in this section comes from eight-months of field 
work, which I personally carried out, between May 2005 and January 2006, in four 
different EUropean regions (Lombardia, Italy; Pirkanmaa, Finland; North-East of 
England, United Kingdom; and Languedoc-Roussillon, France). Overall, I administered 
about 100 semi-structured individual interviews with ‘local elites’ – here defined as any 
person holding a political, institutional or social role within the local society – and 16 
focus groups, with 4-5 participants in each, males and females, aged 18-26 years old, 
using education as a ‘control characteristic’ (Bedford and Burgess 2001). As such, in 
each region two groups were formed by participants with a university degree or in the 
process of obtaining it (henceforth labelled as ‘students’ for matter of brevity) and two 
groups by participants without a university degree and not willing to obtain it in the 
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future, who were already occupied in a low-skilled position or were studying in 
vocational schools (henceforth labelled as ‘workers’). I detailed elsewhere both the 
process for selecting the four regions and the sampling of individual interviewees and 
focus group participants (Antonsich 2008b). I should note that these data were collected 
for a larger research project, aimed at exploring the relationship between territory and 
identity at multiple scales – local, regional, national, and EUropean (Antonsich 2007). In 
this article, however, I will only focus on data collected for EUrope and, more 
specifically, on data related to the question of what EUrope means for the respondents.  
The analysis of these opinions clearly confirms the relevance of the ethnic-civic 
distinction also in relation to EUrope. On the one hand, in fact, respondents talked of 
EUrope by using the same ethno-cultural categories which they would have used to 
describe their own nation-state: language, culture, people, history, traditions, religion, 
laws, and political institutions. These elements were generally discussed either in relation 
to their richness (‘EUrope is made up of many diverse traditions and this is what makes 
EUrope unique’) or in negative terms, as respondents remarked the lack of a common 
language, history, etc. While in the first case a sense of EUropean identity, attachment or, 
more vaguely, sympathy emerged in the discourses of the respondents (a point confirmed 
also by other quantitative studies – e.g., Licata et al. 2003), in the second case EUrope 
remained a distant subject, which did not trigger any emotional feelings. 
On the other hand, the comments of focus group participants and, more frequently, 
individual interviewees (particularly those holding left-wing political views), showed a 
post-national understanding of EUrope. In this case, EUrope was defined as a space of 
democracy, tolerance, humanism, and protection of human rights – a sort of lighthouse 
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for the rest of the world. This view clearly resonates with the cosmopolitan values which 
inform the Habermasian version of civic EUrope. In this case the respondents also talked 
of a sense of personal identification with this post-national or civic EUrope – a point 
which scores in favour of Habermas’s call for empirically testing his idea of civicness 
rather than dismissing it out of hand for being too abstract (Pensky 2001: xiv). 
Yet, respondents also commented on the idea of EUrope in a way which goes beyond 
this ethnic-civic distinction. They talked indeed of EUrope in utilitarian terms, as an 
institutional space which can further both their own personal well-being and the welfare 
of the nation-state to which they belong and primarily identify with. In neither case, 
however, was there a sense of identification, emotional attachment or cultural belonging 
expressed by the respondent. Given the importance of the utilitarian dimension to 
speculate on alternatives to the ethnic-civic distinction, I shall spend more time and 
illustrate it with some direct quotes.  
From a personal utilitarian perspective, EUrope was often associated with mundane 
aspects of everyday life – e.g., freedom of travel, convenience of using a common 
currency, opportunities of studying and working in other EUropean countries. These 
comments emerged particularly during the focus group discussions, without any 
noticeable difference in terms of the regions of the participants, their gender and 
education. As remarked, for instance, by two different participants:  
 
“For me, Europe is something positive. I see Europe principally through the 
opportunities that it offers to travel, to exchange…”  
(Laetitia, French ‘student’, aged 20) 
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“I enjoy going to different countries and experiencing their culture. I don’t want to be 
part of one large European culture, I want it to be national identity that they can 
ascribe to and I can subscribe to mine, for me that works fine”  
(Matt, English ‘student’, 19) 
 
EUrope answers the needs of the modern individual to travel, to communicate, to 
exchange information and experiences. This clearly resonates with the image of the 
mobile European citizen put forward by Verstraete (2010). Yet, while I subscribe to her 
idea that sharing, in principle, the same mobility might be the unifying factor on which to 
build a common EUropean identity (although, I would say, a very fragile, contingent and 
temporary one), it is also interesting to observe that no reference to personal or social 
identification emerged from the respondents’ accounts. These reproduced instead a 
disjuncture between the functional and the cultural, as illustrated by the following two 
passages from a focus group discussion among English students: 
 
“I don’t feel European in the slightest; no, not even a small bit, but I do think of it as 
somewhere where I want to spend a lot of time, where I want to spend most of my 
future, I think, on the continent of Europe […] I think you can do that, you can live 
there and… um… be involved in the local society but still you don’t have to feel 
specifically European.” 
(Judy, English ‘student’, aged 23) 
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“Europe to me is it’s a bit like the GB, UK thing to me, they’re kind of not so much to 
do with culture and identity, they’re political things, they’re to do with money and 
economy and managing people and Europe has recently just incorporated a whole lot 
of new countries […]. I don’t actually feel European, I just want to reap the benefits 
from being a European citizen […]. With modern, like, Western, capitalist kind of 
society and culture I think that kind of umbrella hierarchy, structure is basically 
necessary to govern and manage those aspects of life but then I want to keep because 
that’s all very personal, I want to keep cultural identity close to me, have it personal, 
have it meaningful.” 
(Anna, English ‘student’, aged 24) 
 
EUrope is a functional space where the individual can realise her/his Self. It is a space 
chosen for its quality of life. It protects the rights of the individual and enhances her/his 
well-being. Yet, it is not conceived as a space of identity, a socio-spatial category with 
which the subject identifies (Chryssochoou 2003) and which is charged with an 
‘emotional investment’ – a key identity aspect according to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 
1982: 2). 
A similar absence of an identity dimension emerged also in those comments referring 
to EUrope as a functional space which can help the nation-state to better compete in the 
global economy. This argument was heard mainly among elite interviewees rather 
uniformly across the geographical case studies and the political and/or economic interests 
they represented. They saw EUrope, with its critical mass, as the only viable way to 
compete successfully against the other major world economies - USA and China: 
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 “If we think that there is Asia, the US, maybe there should be Europe as one” 
(Anonymous representative of the Confederation of Finnish Industries) 
 
“We are gonna be kicked off, if you like, if we are not strong… strong, in Europe, 
paneuropean… political and economic clout… we are gonna be kicked off. It’s a 
matter of need and anything else.” 
(Anonymous representative of the Labour Party in County Durham, North East of 
England)  
 
These narratives are certainly not confined within elite groups, as they are actually 
rather widespread within European societies. They reproduce what Weiss (2002) has 
named ‘globalization rhetoric’ – a rhetoric which finds the rationale for the existence of 
EUrope somewhere outside EUrope itself, beyond any internal identity discourse, 
whether cultural or political. Thus, it is not surprising that the image of EUrope as a 
functional-utilitarian space created in the interest of the nation-state (Brenner, 1999) was 
also voiced among focus group participants, as for instance exemplified by the following 
quote: 
 
“[Europe] is the spare wheel if the country goes wrong. […] For development, it’s 
good; but I don’t think that Europe touches on our cultures: we don’t feel European 
[…]. Europe does good things, it’s practical, but apart from that there is not a 
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European culture. I would not make a difference between a European and a non-
European.” 
(Aurélien, French ‘non-student’, aged 18) 
 
However trenchant in tone, this quote is representative of an attitude towards EUrope 
shared by quite a few participants, across the different socio-demographic and regional 
characteristics. EUrope matters, but it does not necessarily activate a sentiment of 
personal or social identity: 
 
 “Yes, I agree with the fact that we have to put everything in common, but this does 
not make our identity […]. Europe is very good, [it’s good] that we are all together, 
hand in hand, but we should preserve our individuality and our culture. To have all 
the same culture would not serve to anything.” 
(Emilie, French ‘non-student’, aged 18) 
 
From this utilitarian perspective, EUrope is not narrated in terms of identity; it is not a 
source of a collective ‘we-feeling’, either ethnic, cultural, or civic (Bruter 2005). Yet, this 
absence of identity does not prevent the respondents to acknowledge EUrope’s political, 
social, and economic relevance. As expressed by two French students: 
 
“I voted no [in the referendum on the European Constitution on 29 May 2005], 
because if I don’t have a cultural attachment to Europe, I still want that we make 
common projects” (Cindy, French ‘student’, aged 23) 
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“I see Europe as a medium of social and political cohesion. At the cultural level, as a 
medium of management of heritage. At an identity level… no.” 
(Audrey, French ‘student’, aged 24)  
 
It is important to note that this utilitarian perspective is not as marginal as one might 
think with regard to people’s perceptions of EUrope. In fact, it also clearly emerges from 
the periodical surveys administered by the Eurobarometer consortium.1 Moreover, it is 
also one of the key factors which explain popular support for the EU (Gabel 1998; Fuchs, 
2010), besides being regarded, by some scholars (Moravcsik, 1998), as the driving force 
behind EUropean integration. Yet, it does not seem that scholars have paid the due 
attention to the challenge that this perspective poses to the specific relationship between 
territory, people, and sovereignty which has so far characterized the nation-state. Either 
in its ethnic, cultural or civic version, a sense of collective identity has indeed been the 
glue which has preserved this relationship and on which the nation-state has built the 
rationale for its existence. When people, however, talk of EUrope in terms of a political 
and territorial community without mobilizing a ‘we-feeling’ to justify their support to this 
community, it means that, from a politico-institutional point of view, we are witnessing 
something new, which cannot simply be captured by the old ethnic-civic distinction. To 
remain within this analytical framework would limit our theoretical scope. It would 
prevent alternative visions by which to decipher new ways in which territory, people, and 
sovereignty are tied to each other beyond the idea of a common identity. 
                                                 
1  See survey data for ‘Meaning of the EU’ available on the Eurobarometer Interactive Search 
System (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion). 
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4. EUrope as a ‘laboratory’: Going beyond the ethnic-civic divide 
 
As framed by the ethnic-civic opposition, the debate over the future of EUrope has 
focused on what kind of identity the EUropean demos should embody. The post-national 
or civic camp has rejected the possibility for culturally homogenous demos, since the new 
post-modern condition has brought about a major structural transformation of political 
institutions. As Delanty (2000, quoted in Rumford, 2003: 37) argues, “we are living in an 
age which has made it impossible to return to one of the great dreams of the project of 
modernity, namely the creation of a unitary principle of integration capable of bringing 
together the domains of economy, polity, culture and society”. Similarly, in the words of 
Beck and Grande (2007: 69), EUrope should not (and could not) become both a nation 
and a state. Thus, from this post-national perspective, a shared political or civic identity 
appears as the only possible recipe to give EUrope a demos. 
This argument has been challenged by the opposite camp, those who believe that 
democracy, solidarity, trust, and loyalty are not possible outside the emotional feelings 
that only a common culture can generate among people (Miller 2000). In other words, the 
demos can exist only when and where a common cultural identity exists (Cederman 
2001). To these critics, Habermas’s constitutional patriotism is too abstract a principle, as 
human society is not made up of citizens, but real individuals who have feelings and 
specific identities (Schnapper 2002: 11). Decoupling the political from the cultural – the 
argument goes – is, therefore, neither feasible nor desirable, as a disembodied, legalistic, 
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and a-cultural view of citizens simply does not correspond to lived reality (Shore 2004: 
29). 
The civic camp, in turn, has rebuffed this criticism, by asserting that trust and 
solidarity do not necessarily have to rest on deep affective feelings of identity and 
belonging (Zürn 2000). Cosmopolitan values (Turner 2002: 57-58), commitment to 
constitutionalism and its ideals (Kumm 2005), shared projects (Nicolaïdis and Howse 
2002: 773), mutual engagement in the public sphere (Calhoun 2002: 156), utilitarian or 
contractual factors (Kaelberer 2004: 162; Kritzinger 2005), and, in Rawlsian terms, a 
sense of justice (Føllesdal 2000) can also work as substitutes. When these elements are in 
place, a sense of collective identity can be generated a posteriori, without being a 
prerequisite for the construction of a politically viable community (Kohli 2000). 
My argument is not to support one or the other of these views, but to observe that 
both are actually more similar in their political speculations than what might appear 
prima facie. Both indeed reproduce for EUrope the same structural relationship between 
territory, people, and politics on which the nation-state has relied. While the national 
(cultural) camp talks of a shared ethnic or cultural identity, the postnational (civic) camp 
talks of a shared civic or political identity as the principle around which this structural 
relationship can still be organized. In other words, both believe that EUrope needs a 
demos, defined either in culturally or politically terms. Although with clear distinctions, 
this means to implicitly classify the new ‘beast’ as belonging to the same family as the 
one of the nation-state. EUrope is indeed debated alike, in terms of a governing principle 
around which trust, solidarity, identity, and belonging coalesce. The creation of the 
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demos is regarded as the necessary step in an accretion process which resembles too 
closely the one theorized for the nation-state (Paasi 2001).  
Yet, in the case of EUrope, empirical evidence also leads to unpacking the bundle 
formed by identity, loyalty, solidarity, trust, attachment, and belonging which, either in 
ethnic-cultural or civic terms, has structured the relationship between territory, people, 
and politics as occurred, at least in principle, in the nation-state. EUrope might be 
something else than a political institution in need of a demos. 
‘EUrope as a laboratory’ is often voiced by scholars as a way to signal that EUrope 
stands for something new in the panorama of politico-constitutional experiments. Yet, it 
seems to me that this expression has also become a sort of dominant, but empty mantra, 
conveniently used to skip indeed the question about what is actually new in this 
experiment. I would argue that the empirical evidence presented in this article brings 
forward an interesting perspective which could substantiate the metaphor of ‘EUrope as a 
laboratory’. The evidence indeed suggests that while both cultural or civic EUrope exists 
as an idea among ordinary people, it also points to the idea of a post-identity EUrope, 
which de facto challenges the necessity of a EUropean demos. Some respondents 
affirmed in fact to be in favour of EUrope, yet they did not feel EUropean, i.e. they did 
not feel belonging to a EUropean demos, either ethnically, culturally or politically.  
Critics would observe that such a lack of common identity would prove fatal to 
EUrope in times of crises, as for instance during the present euro crisis. To predict the 
EUro(pe)’s end is something which obviously lies outside the scientific realm, being in 
fact a matter of mere opinions, conjectures, wishes, fears, etc. Yet, if one has to stick with 
the existing evidence, it would be hard to suggest that a potential EUro(pe)’s end would 
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be a consequence of the lack of common EUropean identity and, in turn, EUropean 
solidarity. Eurobarometer survey data indeed suggest that, in the summer-fall 2010, i.e., 
already in the midst of the present euro crisis, forty nine per cent of respondents affirmed 
to be willing to provide financial help to another member state facing economic and 
financial difficulties.5 Moreover, only few months later, twenty three per cent of 
Eurobarometer respondents believed that the most effective level for tackling the present 
economic and financial crisis was the EU, against twenty per cent who believed it was the 
national government.6 EUrope scored even higher (forty five per cent) than national 
governments (thirty nine per cent) in terms of the effectiveness of the actions put in place 
to tackle the crisis.7 
It is certainly possible that with the intensifying of the crisis these figures could 
change. Yet, the present available evidence seems to suggest that a sense of common 
identity is not necessary for the stability of EUro(pe) (Kaelberer 2004), as long as this 
latter continues to be perceived as effective in its governance capacity (Kritzinger 2005). 
This would confirm the principle of ‘secondary allegiance’ put forward by Van 
Kersbergen (2000) – i.e., as long as EUrope is perceived to work to the benefit of 
national states, citizens would profess their allegiance to EUrope as well. 
I should make clear that filling the metaphor of ‘Europe as a laboratory’ with this 
utilitarian content should not be taken as a normative project. I am not in fact proposing 
EUrope to be such a utilitarian polity. I am simply taking seriously a view which emerges 
from the voices of the EUropean demos, rather than simply discarding it because it is 
deemed not enough to produce stable, democratic institutional spaces, supported by 
mutual solidarity and trust as we have known them so far. To remain open to this view 
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from the demos means to continue exploring the extent to which EUrope is a laboratory. 
To discard it for the reasons just mentioned simply means to believe that there is only one 
model that works, whereas all the others are doomed to failure - i.e., we already know it 
all.  
Let me finally point to another factor which I think should stimulate scholars to 
continue exploring ‘EUrope as a laboratory’, namely the changing ethno-cultural face of 
Europeans. In 2010, the Eurostat datum about foreign-born people residing in the EU-27 
space was equal to 9.4% of the total EUropean population.8 Although already relevant, 
this datum should however be complemented with figures related to the percentage of 
foreign citizens, refugees, undocumented migrants, second generation ‘immigrants’ and 
individuals with mixed background. How, within this context of ‘super-diversity’ 
(Vertovec 2007), would still be possible to talk of a common EUropean identity becomes 
therefore even more problematic. It seems indeed not realistic to believe that everybody 
would share the same individual liberal values, equally commit to constitutionalism and 
its ideals, or regularly adopt the same rational proceduralism to deal with conflicting 
views, as maintained by Habermas’s constitutional patriotism (Baumeister 2007). 
The notion of multilevel governance has answered the question about the institutional 
nature of the beast by fully espousing a pluralistic view, beyond the traditional opposition 
between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. I believe that if we want to further 
our understanding of EUrope in cultural and political terms, we should equally open our 
analytical tools to plurality, liberating them, among others, from the binary opposition of 
the ethnic-civic debate. Free vision and ‘dirty feet’ (i.e., walking into the ethnographical 
 2
 
field) would certainly help enrich our understanding of the cultural and political nature(s) 
of the beast. 
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1 I use henceforth the spelling ‘EUrope’ to suggest the conceptual overlapping which, both in public 
discourses and scholarly research, characterises today Europe and the European Union. It is not here 
possible to critically engage this hegemonic representation, yet the spelling EUrope aims to remind us of 
the politically-charged character of this overlapping. 
 
2 “Identity, norms, community, discourse: cultural approaches to European integration”, University of 
Bristol, Department of Politics, Bristol, 13-14 May 2010. 
 
3 Interestingly, this same ‘national’ view also informs the legal-constitutional debate about EUropean 
integration. See for instance the reservations made by the German Federal Constitutional Court to the 
Treaty of Maastricht on the basis that a minimum common identity is necessary for legitimate democratic 
rule (Mahlmann, 2005). 
 
4 For a similar argument see Chalmers (2006), whose invitation to think of a post-national EUrope as a 
balancing act between ‘the ethnic’ and ‘the civic’ remains however merely stated rather than discussed in 
terms of how actually balancing the two dimensions. 
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5 Special Eurobarometer 74.1 (fieldwork: August-September 2010; publication: November 2010), p. 63-64. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb741parl_en.pdf. In Germany, the country most 
financially exposed to the bailout of Greece, this figure was only slightly lower: forty six per cent. 
 
6 Standard Eurobarometer 74 (Autumn wave; fieldwork: November 2010; publication: February 2011), p. 
15. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_cri_en.pdf. 
 
7 Ibidem, p. 16. 
 
8 See Eurostat News Release 105/2011 available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-
14072011-BP/EN/3-14072011-BP-EN.PDF  
